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In this issue of Neuron, Chowdhury and DeAngelis report that training monkeys to perform a fine depth dis-
crimination abolishes the contribution of signals from area MT to the execution of a different, coarse depth
discrimination. This result calls into question the principle of associating particular visual areaswith particular
visual functions, by showing that such associations are modifiable by experience.
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PreviewsThe architecture of extrastriate visual cor-
tex in primates has been studied for de-
cades. We now know at least two dozen
richly interconnected visual cortical areas
outside primary visual cortex in bothmon-
keys and humans (Van Essen et al., 2001).
A great quest of systems neuroscience
has been to identify the functions per-
formed by each area. Figure 1 shows
a schematic representation of these areas
in themacaquemonkey and their connec-
tions. Broad divisions of function sug-
gested by lesion studies led to an initial
division into parallel dorsal and ventral
‘‘streams’’ of areas (Ungerleider and Mis-
hkin, 1982; color coded in Figure 1), and
the years since have seen many studies
seeking to connect areas and functions
more precisely by linking behavioral mea-
sures of vision to data obtained with three
biological approaches: (1) neurophysio-
logical assessment of neuronal selectiv-
ity, sensitivity, and association with
behavioral choice; (2) lesion or pharmaco-
logical methods to inactivate regions of
cortex; and (3) electrical microstimulation
techniques to activate regions of cortex
artificially. The poster child for the suc-
cess of these methods is visual motion
perception, which has been robustly as-
sociated with activity in dorsal stream
area MT by all three methods: (1) the
high prevalence of directionally selective
neurons in MT immediately suggests
a role for this area in visual motion pro-
cessing, the motion sensitivity of MT neu-
rons closely matches behavioral sensitiv-
ity in monkeys, andMT neuronal activity is
related to behavioral choice in a motion
discrimination; (2) MT lesions selectively
impair motion discrimination; and (3) MT
microstimulation affects behavioral judg-ments of motion (Newsome et al., 1990,
1995).
The signal success of this work led
many to think that similar strategies could
be used to link other visual functions to
other areas, so that each box in a diagram
like Figure 1 could in time be labeled, like
an old map (‘‘here be motion,’’ ‘‘here be
color,’’ ‘‘here be dragons’’), to identify its
particular role in vision. But the case of
motion and MT may be misleading. Visual
motion signals are strongly prevalent only
in MT and a few nearby, closely related
areas, limiting the potential source of sig-
nals for motion perception. Selective re-
sponses to most other features of visual
stimuli, however, are widespread in the
extrastriate visual cortex (Merigan and
Maunsell, 1993). So it should not come
as a surprise that it has proved difficult
to reproduce this initial success in another
domain.
Consider stereoscopic vision, which
extracts the 3D structure of visual scenes
from the differences between the projec-
tions of the visual world onto the two ret-
inas. Neurons in all areas of visual cortex
are usually activated by stimuli delivered
to either eye, and many are also sensitive
to binocular disparity, the proximal geo-
metric cue to stereoscopic depth (Cum-
ming andDeAngelis, 2001). So it is not ob-
vious that one would expect to associate
any particular area with stereoscopic
depth perception. Performance on
a ‘‘coarse’’ stereoscopic judgment task
can be influenced by microstimulation of
MT (DeAngelis et al., 1998), showing that
signals in MT can influence judgments of
depth. Perhaps more surprisingly, inacti-
vating MT with a local injection of musci-
mol disrupts coarse stereopsis, suggest-Neuron 60ing that this area plays a critical rather
than merely a contributory role (Uka and
DeAngelis, 2006). But it emerges that all
forms of stereopsis are not created
equal—in the same study, Uka and DeAn-
gelis showed that inactivating MT does
not affect performance on ‘‘fine’’ stereo-
scopic judgments.
What are ‘‘coarse’’ and ‘‘fine’’ stereop-
sis, and why do they give such different
results? The stimuli for both coarse and
fine stereopsis consist of the same ele-
ments, isolated dots at particular loca-
tions in depth defined by their disparity
with respect to a fixation point. But how
these dots are assembled in the two
cases is different (see Figure 1 of Chowd-
hury and DeAngelis, 2008). For coarse
stereopsis, most dots form a 3D cloud ex-
tended in depth both in front and behind
the fixation plane, all drifting across the
field. Within this cloud, other dots define
a flat surface that is either nearer or farther
than the fixation plane, and the monkey
must decide whether the surface is near
or far. The disparity of the surface is quite
large, hence the term ‘‘coarse’’; perfor-
mance is controlled by adjusting the frac-
tion of dots in the noise cloud. For fine ste-
reopsis, the dots define two surfaces:
a central circle of drifting dots and a sur-
rounding annulus of static ones. Both sur-
faces are out of the fixation plane, and the
monkey’s task is to indicate whether the
inner circle is in front or behind the sur-
round. Performance is controlled by vary-
ing the disparity difference between the
surfaces; the smallest discriminable dis-
parities define the limit of fine depth dis-
crimination, hence the term ‘‘fine.’’ So
both the stimuli and the tasks are quite dif-
ferent: (1) coarse stereopsis requires only, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 195
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PreviewsFigure 1. A Scaled Representation of the Cortical Visual Areas of the Macaque
Each colored rectangle represents a visual area, for the most part following the names and definitions used by Felleman and Van Essen (1991). The gray bands
connecting the areas represent the connections between them. Areas above the equator of the figure (reds, browns) belong to the dorsal stream. Areas below the
equator (blues, greens) belong to the ventral stream. Following Lennie (1998), each area is drawn with a size proportional to its cortical surface area, and the lines
connecting the areas each have a thickness proportional to the estimated number of fibers in the connection. The estimate is derived by assuming that each area
has a number of output fibers proportional to its surface area and that these fibers are divided among the target areas in proportion to their surface areas. The
connection strengths represented are therefore not derived from quantitative anatomy and furthermore represent only feedforward pathways, though most or all
of the pathways shown are bidirectional. The original version of this figure was prepared in 1998 by John Maunsell.an absolute depth judgment with respect
to fixation, while fine stereopsis requires
the judgment of relative depth, i.e., com-
paring depth across space; (2) the partic-
ular coarse stereopsis task used requires
the monkey to discriminate a signal in
noise, while the fine task does not; (3)
the range of disparities is quite different.
Chowdhury and DeAngelis (2008) repli-
cate the finding that monkeys initially
trained on coarse stereopsis show im-
paired coarse depth discrimination when
muscimol is injected into MT. Remark-
ably, the same animals, after a second
round of training on fine stereopsis, are
unimpaired at either fine or coarse depth
discrimination by similar injections. More-
over, recordings inMT show that neuronal
responses are not altered by learning the
fine stereopsis task. Given the differences
between the tasks and the large number196 Neuron 60, October 23, 2008 ª2008 Elsof visual areas containing disparity-sensi-
tive neurons, one might not be surprised
to find different areas involved in the two
tasks. But it is quite unexpected that
merely learning one task would change
the contribution of areas previously in-
volved in the other. Chowdhury and
DeAngelis conclude that the change in
outcome reflects a change in neural de-
coding—decision centers that decode
signals to render judgments of depth,
finding MT signals unreliable for the fine
stereopsis task, switch their inputs to se-
lect some better source of disparity infor-
mation. Candidates include ventral
stream areas V4 or IT, where relative dis-
parity signals have been reported (Orban,
2008) and which contain far more neurons
than MT (Figure 1). When challenged
afresh with the coarse depth task, these
same decision centers may now find thatevier Inc.their new sources of information can solve
the coarse task as well as the old ones.
MT is no longer critical.
Perhaps in other monkeys MT would
never have a role in stereopsis at all.
ChowdhuryandDeAngelis’monkeyswere
trained simultaneously or previously to
discriminate motion, which engages MT.
Faced with a qualitatively similar random
dot stimulus, it might make sense for the
cortex to try to solve the new problem of
stereopsis with existing decoding strate-
gies.But if the animalswere initially trained
on adifferent task—say, a texture discrim-
ination—MT might never be engaged at
all. It would also be interesting to see the
outcome ifmonkeyswere trainedondepth
tasks that were less different and could
be interleaved in the same sessions, for
example noise-limited depth judgments
using similar absolute or relative disparity
Neuron
Previewscues. Muscimol injection could then be
used to ask whether animals could switch
between sensory representations from
moment tomoment, aswell as frommonth
to month.
Perhaps the most surprising thing
about the results of Chowdhury and
DeAngelis is that they surprise us. Visual
cortex is chock-full of cells sensitive to
binocular depth (Cumming and DeAnge-
lis, 2001; Orban, 2008). Why should we
expect cells in just one area to be critical
for depth perception? We can perhaps
trace the blame back to Lettvin et al.
(1959), the famous paper whose title
‘‘What the frog’s eye tells the frog’s brain’’
implicitly asserts that signals from a neu-
ron selective for some feature exist de
facto to support behavioral responses to
that feature. But this is teleology. We
don’t learn the purpose of a neuron—orThe Hippocampus
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Humans have a natural ability to gai
Neuron, Shohamy and Wagner rev
through a partnership between puta
Deriving new knowledge from past expe-
riences can arguably be viewed as one of
the most far reaching capabilities of hu-
man memory. Niels Bohr, the venerated
Danish physicist, is an impressive exam-
ple: his first quantum model of the atom
published in 1913, is an innovative syn-
thesis of the ideas of Planck, Einstein,
and Rutherford. How, then, does the hu-
man brain accomplish such feats? In their
paper in this issue of Neuron, Shohamy
and Wagner (2008) approach an impor-
tant aspect of this puzzling question,
our ability to efficiently generalize past ex-an area full of neurons—by measuring its
selectivity. For that, we must make direct
measurements of the relationship be-
tween neuronal activity and behavior.
Put simply, even though neuronal signals
in some area may tell all we want to
know about some feature, that fact alone
is no reason to assume that the cells
downstream are actually listening.
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and proficient way of achieving the same
goal: this is to detect and to encode gen-
eralizations as events around us unfold
over time and store these generalizations
as memories. The beauty of such a mech-
anism is that it makes generalizations
available when they are needed without
requiring the effortful ‘‘retrieval-based’’
route. Thepossibility of suchamechanism
is exciting, but so far its identity and
operating mechanisms have remained
elusive. Now, Shohamy and Wagner
(2008) havediscoveredsuchamechanism
and termed it ‘‘integrative encoding.’’
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